Information aggregation and communication in committees

David Austen-Smith*, Timothy J. Feddersen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we attempt to explain the underlying strategic incentives confronting individuals when they must make a collective decision over a set of alternatives and each has information that is decision-relevant for others. A significant literature has emerged in formal political theory over the past several years that focuses on such problems, paying particular attention, first, to the extent to which voting can be expected to aggregate committee members' information and, second, to the role of communication among committee members prior to voting. Inter alia, this literature reveals a surprisingly subtle interaction between the voting rules used to make decisions and the incentives for committee members to share information prior to voting.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)763-769
Number of pages7
JournalPhilosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Volume364
Issue number1518
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 27 2009

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Keywords

  • Committees
  • Communication
  • Information

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)

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