Information revelation in relational contracts

Yuk Fai Fong, Jin Li

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We explore subjective performance reviews in long-term employment relationships. We show that firms benefit from separating the task of evaluating the worker from the task of paying him. The separation allows the reviewer to better manage the review process, and can, therefore, reward the worker for his good performance with not only a good review contemporaneously, but also a promise of better review in the future. Such reviews spread the reward for the worker's good performance across time and lower the firm's maximal temptation to renege on the reward. The manner in which information is managed exhibits patterns consistent with a number of well-documented biases in performance reviews.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)277-299
Number of pages23
JournalReview of Economic Studies
Volume84
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2017

Keywords

  • Information
  • Relational contract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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