Information transmission and voting

Yingni Guo*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


I analyze an individual’s incentive to disclose hard evidence in the context of committee voting. A committee consists of three members: one left-leaning, one right-leaning, and the third ex ante unbiased. They decide on whether to pursue a left or right policy by majority rule. One of them has private information about the merits of the policies and can privately send verifiable messages to the others. If the informed member is unbiased, he withholds information to neutralize the other two’s votes when preferences are sufficiently diverse. If the informed member is biased, then the others can better infer his information, knowing that any information favoring his agenda will be shared. In the latter case, because more information is effectively shared, higher social welfare results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)835-868
Number of pages34
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number3
StatePublished - Oct 2021


  • Committee decision making
  • Verifiable disclosure
  • Voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Information transmission and voting'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this