How, if at all, does one's intention to realize an end bear on the justification for taking the means to that end? Theories that allow that intending an end directly provides a reason to take the means are subject to a well-known "bootstrapping" objection. On the other hand, "anti-psychologistic" accounts-which seek to derive instrumental reasons directly from the reasons that support adopting the end itself-have unacceptable implications where an agent faces multiple rationally permissible options. An alternative, predictive, role for intention in means-end reasoning is considered and rejected. A new proposal is then developed, according to which instrumental reasons are not merely reasons to perform an act necessary for a given end, but to perform the act for the sake of that end.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||16|
|Journal||American Philosophical Quarterly|
|State||Published - Jul 1 2018|
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