Interactive beliefs, epistemic independence and strong rationalizability

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Marciano Siniscalchi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

We use a universal, extensive form interactive beliefs system to provide an epistemic characterization of a weak and a strong notion of rationalizability with independent beliefs. The weak solution concept is equivalent to backward induction in generic perfect information games where no player moves more than once in any play. The strong solution concept is related to explicability (Reny, 1992) and is outcome-equivalent to backward induction in generic games of perfect information.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)247-273
Number of pages27
JournalResearch in Economics
Volume53
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1999

Keywords

  • Explicability
  • Forward induction
  • Independence
  • Interactive epistemology
  • Rationalizability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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