Interactive Implementation

Sandeep Baliga; Tomas Sjöström

doi:10.1006/game.1998.0671

Interactive Implementation

Sandeep Baliga^*, Tomas Sjöström

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

We suppose the principal not only designs a mechanism, but can participate as a player. The result is a Bayesian model where one player, the principal, has no information, and the remaining players have complete information. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for implementation. In contrast to the standard model, in the exchange economy manycardinalrules, such as the utilitarian social welfare function, satisfy this condition and hence can be implemented. Compared to the literature on Bayesian implementation, our mechanisms are rather simple. The idea is that the agents announce a state of the world, while the principal announces a strategy profile for the agents.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D71, D78.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	38-63
Number of pages	26
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	27
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0671
State	Published - Apr 1999

Funding

*The idea for this paper appeared in discussions with Tom Palfrey. Our debt to him is obvious. We are grateful to Rajiv Vohra, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Harvard University for helpful comments. Sandeep Baliga acknowledges the financial support of ESRC Grant Number R000221728.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/game.1998.0671

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Interactive Implementation

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

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