Abstract
Through interdiction models, we infer the vulnerabilities inherent in an operational system. This chapter presents four applications of interdiction modeling: (a) to delay an adversary’s development of a first nuclear weapon; (b) to understand vulnerabilities in an electric power system; (c) to locate sensors in a municipal water network; and (d) to secure a border against a nuclear smuggler. In each case, we detail and interpret the mathematical model and characterize insights gained from solving instances of the model. We point to special structures that sometimes arise in interdiction models and the associated implications for analyses. From these examples, themes emerge on how one should model, and defend against, an intelligent adversary.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | International Series in Operations Research and Management Science |
Publisher | Springer New York LLC |
Pages | 73-103 |
Number of pages | 31 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2013 |
Publication series
Name | International Series in Operations Research and Management Science |
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Volume | 183 |
ISSN (Print) | 0884-8289 |
Funding
The authors thank Regan Murray, Javier Sameron, Jean-Paul Watson, and Kevin Wood whose thoughtful comments improved this chapter. This work has been supported by the National Science Foundation through grants CMMI-0653916 and CMMI-0800676, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency through grant HDTRA1-08-1-0029, and the US Department of Homeland Security under Grant Award Number 2008-DN-077-ARI021-05. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the US Department of Homeland Security.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Computer Science Applications
- Strategy and Management
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Applied Mathematics