Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule

David Austen-Smith*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

81 Scopus citations


This paper examines a simple model of multiple referrals under open rule. In the model, an uninformed House multiply refers legislation to two specialist committees (experts) who have policy preferences. Under open rule, committees′ proposals are analytically equivalent to speeches giving advice to the House about what policy to choose. Two different forums for giving advice, or making proposals, are examined: multiple joint referral and multiple sequential referral. The informational properties of these forums are compared to each other and to single referral.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3-43
Number of pages41
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 1993

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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