Interpersonal epistemic entitlements

Sanford C. Goldberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief-forming processes - perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others - is not restricted to one's own belief-forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others' processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are "interpersonal." I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non-standard version of anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, and a more "extended" epistemology - one that calls into question the epistemic significance that has traditionally been ascribed to the boundaries separating individual subjects.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)159-183
Number of pages25
JournalNous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues
Volume24
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2014

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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