Introduction: Symposium on Noncooperative Bargaining

Peter Linhart*, Roy Radner, Mark Satterthwaite

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

This Symposium includes 12 models of bargaining. Each of the following characteristics is shared by most of them: (1) bargaining is noncooperative within a set of rules governing the process of negotiation (the "Nash Program"); (2) bargaining is bilateral; (3) some or all of the traders are incompletely informed. The authors explore the existence, multiplicity, and efficiency of equilibria and the plausibility of equilibria as descriptions of observed behavior. In addition, some authors discuss the effects of nonbinding preplay communication ("cheap talk"), the effects of increasing the number of players, and alternatives to the Nash equilibrium framework.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-17
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume48
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1989

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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