TY - JOUR
T1 - Introduction
T2 - Symposium on Noncooperative Bargaining
AU - Linhart, Peter
AU - Radner, Roy
AU - Satterthwaite, Mark
PY - 1989/6
Y1 - 1989/6
N2 - This Symposium includes 12 models of bargaining. Each of the following characteristics is shared by most of them: (1) bargaining is noncooperative within a set of rules governing the process of negotiation (the "Nash Program"); (2) bargaining is bilateral; (3) some or all of the traders are incompletely informed. The authors explore the existence, multiplicity, and efficiency of equilibria and the plausibility of equilibria as descriptions of observed behavior. In addition, some authors discuss the effects of nonbinding preplay communication ("cheap talk"), the effects of increasing the number of players, and alternatives to the Nash equilibrium framework.
AB - This Symposium includes 12 models of bargaining. Each of the following characteristics is shared by most of them: (1) bargaining is noncooperative within a set of rules governing the process of negotiation (the "Nash Program"); (2) bargaining is bilateral; (3) some or all of the traders are incompletely informed. The authors explore the existence, multiplicity, and efficiency of equilibria and the plausibility of equilibria as descriptions of observed behavior. In addition, some authors discuss the effects of nonbinding preplay communication ("cheap talk"), the effects of increasing the number of players, and alternatives to the Nash equilibrium framework.
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U2 - 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90117-8
DO - 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90117-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:38249022651
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 48
SP - 1
EP - 17
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -