Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design

Dirk Bergemann*, Alessandro Pavan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

The Introduction to the Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design" of the Journal of Economic Theory provides an overview of the dynamic mechanism design literature. We then introduce the papers that are contained in the Symposium issue and finally conclude by discussing avenues for future research. Several of the papers contained in the Symposium issue were presented at the Economic Theory Workshop of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University in June 2013.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)679-701
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume159
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2015

Keywords

  • Dynamic contracts
  • Dynamic mechanism design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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