Introduction to the symposium on Kristina daugirdas, “Reputation as a disciplinarian of international organizations”

Karen Alter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

The spectacular failings of international organizations (IOs) generate front page news. UN peacekeepers, for example, are blamed for triggering a cholera epidemic in Haiti1 and for sexual exploitation in the Central African Republic.2 The notion that international intervention makes an already bad situation even worse raises anew concerns that international institutions are unaccountable actors.3 Because international institutions enjoy legal immunity, Kristina Daugirdas suggests that reputation might be a substitute force that disciplines IOs.4 Harnessing reputational concerns towards this end, however, is challenging. This symposium engages the challenge that Daugirdas sets out when she asks us to consider whether reputational concerns might be a force that promotes better oversight and behavior by IOs and their employees.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)218-222
Number of pages5
JournalAJIL Unbound
Volume113
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

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International Organizations
reputation
immunity
exploitation
UNO
news
employee

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Law

Cite this

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