Is legal cognition computational? (When will DeepVehicle replace Judge Hercules?)

Paul Gowder*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Could we insert machine learning into the adjudicative process? This chapter considers the extent of the isomorphism between common law reasoning from prior cases and machine learning reasoning from prior observations, as well as the normative considerations governing any such use. It ultimately concludes that we could use machine learning models to assist judges in reasoning about some questions of law, but only in the context of an ordinary legal process regulating both the use and the forms of such models. Ultimately, machine learning would be less likely to replace judicial reasoning and legal argument than to move it around.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationComputational Legal Studies
Subtitle of host publicationThe Promise and Challenge of Data-Driven Research
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Pages215-237
Number of pages23
ISBN (Electronic)9781788977456
ISBN (Print)9781788977449
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Social Sciences

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