Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure

Ginger Zhe Jin*, Michael Luca, Daniel Martin

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but their actions and beliefs suggest that many are insuff-ciently skeptical about nondisclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback. (JEL C70, D82, D83)

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)141-173
Number of pages33
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume13
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2021

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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