Job mobility, wage dispersion, and technological change: An asymmetric information perspective

Jin Li*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper develops a model of job mobility and wage dispersion with asymmetric information. Contrary to existing models in which the superior information of current employers leads to market collapse, this model generates a unique equilibrium outcome in which (a) positive turnover exists and (b) identical workers may be paid differently. The model implies that, in the presence of technological change that is skill-biased and favors general skills over firm-specific skills, the wage distribution becomes more spread out (corresponding to greater inequality) and job mobility increases.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)105-126
Number of pages22
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume60
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2013

Keywords

  • Asymmetric information
  • Inequality
  • Turnover

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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