Judicial auditing

Matt Spitzer, Eric Talley

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    41 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    This paper presents a simple framework for analyzing a hierarchical system of judicial auditing. We concentrate on (what we perceive to be) the two principal reasons that courts and/or legislatures tend to scrutinize the decisions of lower-echelon actors: imprecision and ideological bias. In comparing these two reasons, we illustrate how each may yield systematically distinct auditing and reversal behaviors. While auditing for imprecision tends to bring about evenhanded review/ reversal, auditing for political bias tends to be contingent on the first mover's chosen action. Examples of these tendencies can be found in a number of legal applications, including administrative law, constitutional law, and interpretive theories of jurisprudence. Our analysis also suggests that political "diversity" among initial decision makers (in addition to its other laudable goals) may be an important and generally underappreciated means for economizing on judicial administrative costs.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Number of pages1
    JournalJournal of Legal Studies
    Volume29
    Issue number2 PART I
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jun 2000

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Law

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Judicial auditing'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this