@article{2258ccef4b9546cf9148d2dda7e369f3,
title = "Judicial Mechanism Design",
abstract = "This paper proposes a mechanism-design approach to study criminal justice systems. We derive properties of optimal mechanisms for two notions of welfare distinguished by their treatment of deterrence. These properties provide insights into the effects of defendants' private information about their guilt; highlight forces that may underlie certain features of existing systems, such as plea bargaining and binary verdicts and the separation of fact-finding and sentencing; and indicate directions for possible improvements of criminal trials, such as varying the standard for conviction across crimes.",
author = "Ron Siegel and Bruno Strulovici",
note = "Funding Information: * Siegel: Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University (email: rus41@psu.edu); Strulovici: Department of Economics, Northwestern University (email: b-strulovici@northwestern.edu). Leslie Marx was coeditor for this article. We are grateful for questions, discussions, and comments from multiple audiences. Strulovici acknowledges early financial support from a National Science Foundation CAREER Award (Grant No. 1151410) and a fellowship from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Part of this research was conducted while Strulovici was visiting the University of Tokyo, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. †Go to https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220100 to visit the article page for additional materials and author disclosure statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} (2023). All Rights Reserved.",
year = "2023",
doi = "10.1257/MIC.20220100",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "15",
pages = "243--270",
journal = "American Economic Journal: Microeconomics",
issn = "1945-7669",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "3",
}
