Abstract
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th largest coalition (by the sum of weights of its members) wins the i-th largest prize, which is then shared among its members. We present four solution concepts to analyse the games in this class, and characterise the existence of stable outcomes in games with three players and two prizes, and in games with uniform prizes. We then explore the efficiency of stable outcomes in terms of Pareto optimality and utilitarian social welfare. Finally, we study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 2049-2057 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS |
| Volume | 2023-May |
| State | Published - 2023 |
| Event | 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2023 - London, United Kingdom Duration: May 29 2023 → Jun 2 2023 |
Funding
Lee was supported by the Oxford-Taiwan Graduate Scholarship and the Oxford-DeepMind Graduate Scholarship. Wooldridge and Har-renstein were supported by the UKRI under a Turing AI World Leading Researcher Fellowship (EP/W002949/1) awarded to Wooldridge.
Keywords
- Coalition formation
- Cooperative game theory
- Cooperative games with externalities
- Core
- Efficiency
- Partition function form
- Stability
- Weighted Voting Game
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Artificial Intelligence
- Software
- Control and Systems Engineering