Kant's rationalist aesthetics

Rachel Zuckert*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

It is quite standard, even banal, to describe Kant's project in the Critique of Pure Reason [KrV] as a critical reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism, most directly expressed in Kant's claim that intuitions and concepts are two distinct, yet equally necessary, and necessarily interdependent sources of cognition. Similarly, though Kant rejects both the rationalist foundation of morality in the concept of perfection and that of the empiricists in feeling or in the moral sense, one might broadly characterize Kant's moral philosophy as an attempt to reconcile the apriori universality and necessity of rationalist ethics with empiricist (Humean) or sentimentalist (Rousseauean) strictures concerning the distinction between the 'ought' and the 'is', between third personal knowledge of the good and first personal motivation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)443-463
Number of pages21
JournalKant-Studien
Volume98
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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