Knowledge and credit

Jennifer Lackey*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

65 Scopus citations

Abstract

A widely accepted view in recent work in epistemology is that knowledge is a cognitive achievement that is properly creditable to those subjects who possess it. More precisely, according to the Credit View of Knowledge, if S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. In spite of its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, I have elsewhere argued that the Credit View is false. Various responses have been offered to my argument and I here consider each of these objections in turn. I show that none succeeds in undermining my argument and, thus, my original conclusion stands-the Credit View of Knowledge is false.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)27-42
Number of pages16
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume142
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2009

Keywords

  • Credit
  • Credit View of Knowledge
  • Gettier cases
  • Knowledge
  • Testimony

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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