Large Contests

Wojciech Olszewski; Ron Siegel

doi:10.3982/ECTA11696

Large Contests

Wojciech Olszewski, Ron Siegel

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

46 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider contests with many, possibly heterogeneous, players and prizes, and show that the equilibrium outcomes of such contests are approximated by the outcomes of mechanisms that implement the assortative allocation in an environment with a single agent that has a continuum of possible types. This makes it possible to easily approximate the equilibria of contests whose exact equilibrium characterization is complicated, as well as the equilibria of contests for which there is no existing equilibrium characterization.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	835-854
Number of pages	20
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	84
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11696
State	Published - Mar 1 2016

Keywords

All-pay auctions
Asymmetric contests
Large games
Mechanism design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.3982/ECTA11696

Cite this

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KW - Mechanism design

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Large Contests

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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