@article{c1e5da9370cd401eb88cc837adb7db8b,
title = "Large contests without single crossing",
abstract = "We show that the equilibria of contests with many players and prizes are approximated by certain single-agent mechanisms. This complements the work of Olszewski and Siegel (Econometrica 84:835–854, 2016), who considered a more restricted environment in which players{\textquoteright} utility function satisfies a strict single crossing condition. Relaxing strict single crossing enlarges the set of approximating mechanisms and weakens the notion of approximation, but implications regarding equilibrium behavior in large contests can nevertheless often be derived. When the approximating mechanism is unique, a stronger notion of approximation obtains.",
keywords = "All-pay auctions, Asymmetric contests, Large games, Mechanism design",
author = "Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel",
note = "Funding Information: We thank three referees for extremely helpful comments and suggestions that improved the paper substantially, and Ivan Canay, Joel Horowitz, and participants in the Current Frontiers in the Theory of Contests conference for very helpful suggestions. Financial support from the NSF (Grant SES-1325968) is gratefully acknowledged. Funding Information: We thank three referees for extremely helpful comments and suggestions that improved the paper substantially, and Ivan Canay, Joel Horowitz, and participants in the Current Frontiers in the Theory of Contests conference for very helpful suggestions. Financial support from the NSF (Grant SES-1325968) is gratefully acknowledged. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.",
year = "2022",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1007/s00199-019-01244-1",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "74",
pages = "1043--1055",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "4",
}