Large Games: Structural Robustness

Ehud Kalai

doi:10.1057/9780230226203.0933

Large Games: Structural Robustness

Ehud Kalai

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Entry for encyclopedia/dictionary

Abstract

In strategic games with many semi-anonymous players all the equilibria are structurally robust. The equilibria survive under structural alterations of the rules of the game and its information structure, even when the game is embedded in bigger games. Structural robustness implies ex post Nash conditions and a stronger condition of information-proofness. It also implies fast learning, self-purification and strong rational expectations in market games. Structurally robust equilibria may be used to model games with highly unspecified structures, such as games played on the web.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
Editors	Steven N. Durlauf, Lawrence E. Blume
Place of Publication	Hampshire, UK
Publisher	Palgrave Macmillan
Edition	2nd
ISBN (Print)	9780230226388
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230226203.0933
State	Published - 2008

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10.1057/9780230226203.0933

http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_L000239

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Large Games: Structural Robustness

Abstract

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