Large Games: Structural Robustness

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingEntry for encyclopedia/dictionary

Abstract

In strategic games with many semi-anonymous players all the equilibria are structurally robust. The equilibria survive under structural alterations of the rules of the game and its information structure, even when the game is embedded in bigger games. Structural robustness implies ex post Nash conditions and a stronger condition of information-proofness. It also implies fast learning, self-purification and strong rational expectations in market games. Structurally robust equilibria may be used to model games with highly unspecified structures, such as games played on the web.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
EditorsSteven N. Durlauf, Lawrence E. Blume
Place of PublicationHampshire, UK
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan
Edition2nd
ISBN (Print)9780230226388
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008

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