### Abstract

The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of large Bayesian repeated anonymous games.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Number of pages | 31 |

State | Published - 2013 |

### Fingerprint

### Cite this

}

**Large Repeated Games with Uncertain Fundamentals I : Compressed Equilibrium.** / Kalai, Ehud; Shmaya, Eran.

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper

TY - UNPB

T1 - Large Repeated Games with Uncertain Fundamentals I

T2 - Compressed Equilibrium

AU - Kalai, Ehud

AU - Shmaya, Eran

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the number of players is known.The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of large Bayesian repeated anonymous games.

AB - Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the number of players is known.The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of large Bayesian repeated anonymous games.

M3 - Discussion paper

BT - Large Repeated Games with Uncertain Fundamentals I

ER -