Large Repeated Games with Uncertain Fundamentals I: Compressed Equilibrium

Ehud Kalai, Eran Shmaya

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Abstract

Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the number of players is known.

The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of large Bayesian repeated anonymous games.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Number of pages31
StatePublished - 2013

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