Large Repeated Games with Uncertain Fundamentals I: Compressed Equilibrium

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Abstract

Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the number of players is known.

The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of large Bayesian repeated anonymous games.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Number of pages31
StatePublished - 2013

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Repeated games
Interaction
Game theory
Large games
General theory
Bayesian games

Cite this

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title = "Large Repeated Games with Uncertain Fundamentals I: Compressed Equilibrium",
abstract = "Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the number of players is known.The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of large Bayesian repeated anonymous games.",
author = "Ehud Kalai and Eran Shmaya",
year = "2013",
language = "English (US)",
type = "WorkingPaper",

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TY - UNPB

T1 - Large Repeated Games with Uncertain Fundamentals I

T2 - Compressed Equilibrium

AU - Kalai, Ehud

AU - Shmaya, Eran

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the number of players is known.The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of large Bayesian repeated anonymous games.

AB - Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the number of players is known.The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of large Bayesian repeated anonymous games.

M3 - Discussion paper

BT - Large Repeated Games with Uncertain Fundamentals I

ER -