Large robust games

Ehud Kalai

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00549.x

Large robust games

Ehud Kalai^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

102 Scopus citations

Abstract

Decision and Game Sciences at the Kellogg School of Management With many semi-anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous-move games are extensively robust. This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous-play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1631-1665
Number of pages	35
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	72
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00549.x
State	Published - Nov 2004

Keywords

Anonymous games
Bayesian equilibrium
Ex post nash
Nash equilibrium
Purification
Rational expectations
Robust equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00549.x

Cite this

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title = "Large robust games",

abstract = "Decision and Game Sciences at the Kellogg School of Management With many semi-anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous-move games are extensively robust. This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous-play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.",

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KW - Ex post nash

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Purification

KW - Rational expectations

KW - Robust equilibrium

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Large robust games

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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