Large robust games

Ehud Kalai*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

82 Scopus citations

Abstract

Decision and Game Sciences at the Kellogg School of Management With many semi-anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous-move games are extensively robust. This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous-play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1631-1665
Number of pages35
JournalEconometrica
Volume72
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2004

Keywords

  • Anonymous games
  • Bayesian equilibrium
  • Ex post nash
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Purification
  • Rational expectations
  • Robust equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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