TY - GEN
T1 - Learning in linear games over networks
AU - Eksin, Ceyhun
AU - Molavi, Pooya
AU - Ribeiro, Alejandro
AU - Jadbabaie, Ali
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - We consider a dynamic game over a network with information externalities. Agents' payoffs depend on an unknown true state of the world and actions of everyone else in the network; therefore, the interactions between agents are strategic. Each agent has a private initial piece of information about the underlying state and repeatedly observes actions of her neighbors. We consider strictly concave and supermodular utility functions that exhibit a quadratic form. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of agents' expected utilities in a connected network when it is common knowledge that the agents are myopic and rational. When utility functions are symmetric and adhere to the diagonal dominance criterion, each agent believes that the limit strategies of her neighbors yield the same payoff as her own limit strategy. Given a connected network, this yields a consensus in the actions of agents in the limit. We demonstrate our results using examples from technological and social settings.
AB - We consider a dynamic game over a network with information externalities. Agents' payoffs depend on an unknown true state of the world and actions of everyone else in the network; therefore, the interactions between agents are strategic. Each agent has a private initial piece of information about the underlying state and repeatedly observes actions of her neighbors. We consider strictly concave and supermodular utility functions that exhibit a quadratic form. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of agents' expected utilities in a connected network when it is common knowledge that the agents are myopic and rational. When utility functions are symmetric and adhere to the diagonal dominance criterion, each agent believes that the limit strategies of her neighbors yield the same payoff as her own limit strategy. Given a connected network, this yields a consensus in the actions of agents in the limit. We demonstrate our results using examples from technological and social settings.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84875701149&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/Allerton.2012.6483250
DO - 10.1109/Allerton.2012.6483250
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84875701149
SN - 9781467345385
T3 - 2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2012
SP - 434
EP - 440
BT - 2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2012
T2 - 2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2012
Y2 - 1 October 2012 through 5 October 2012
ER -