Learning to be prepared

Willemien Kets, Mark Voorneveld*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from recent choices. More recent choices can be more salient than other choices, or more readily available in the agent's mind. Alternatively, agents may have formed habits, or use rules of thumb. This paper provides discrete-time adjustment processes for strategic games in which players display such a bias towards recent choices. In addition, players choose best replies to beliefs supported by observed play in the recent past. We characterize the limit behavior of these processes by showing that they eventually settle down in minimal prep sets (Voorneveld in Games Econ Behav 48:403-414, 2004).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)333-352
Number of pages20
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume37
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2008

Keywords

  • Adjustment
  • Availability bias
  • Learning
  • Minimal prep sets
  • Rules of thumb
  • Salience

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Learning to be prepared'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this