Learning to coordinate in a beauty contest game

Pooya Molavi, Ceyhun Eksin, Alejandro Ribeiro, Ali Jadbabaie

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a dynamic game in which a group of players attempt to coordinate on a desired, but only partially known, outcome. The desired outcome is represented by an unknown state of the world. Agents' stage payoffs are represented by a quadratic utility function that captures the kind of tradeoff exemplified by the Keynesian beauty contest: each agent's stage payoff is decreasing in the distance between her action and the unknown state; it is also decreasing in the distance between her action and the average action taken by other agents. The agents thus have the incentive to correctly estimate the state while trying to coordinate with and learn from others. We show that myopic, but Bayesian, agents who repeatedly play this game and observe the actions of their neighbors in a connected network eventually succeed in coordinating on a single action. However, as we show through an example, the consensus action is not necessarily optimal given all the available information.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2013 IEEE 52nd Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2013
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages7358-7363
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781467357173
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2013
Event52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2013 - Florence, Italy
Duration: Dec 10 2013Dec 13 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0191-2216

Other

Other52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2013
CountryItaly
CityFlorence
Period12/10/1312/13/13

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Learning to coordinate in a beauty contest game'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this