Learning with fixed rules: The minority game

Willemien Kets*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper gives a critical account of the literature on adaptive behaviour in the minority game, a simple congestion game. The literature has proposed a model which differs markedly from many standard learning models in that players are endowed with a fixed subset of behavioural rules or response modes which map the observed history to actions. These rules need not have a behavioural interpretation or be derived from some form of optimizing behaviour. Nonetheless, this model gives rise to behaviour that is close to equilibrium behaviour at the aggregate level. The individual-level behaviour predicted by the model seems to capture some aspects of observed experimental behaviour that are difficult to explain using standard models.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)865-878
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Surveys
Volume26
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2012

Keywords

  • Congestion games
  • Experiments
  • Learning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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