Abstract
The paper first reviews some common approaches to setting interconnection charges. It then develops a framework in order to assess these policies and to suggest improvements. The optimal interconnection charges are shown to be discriminatory, and may or may not obey the opportunity cost rule. Their implementation is discussed. Last, the paper shows that, when the number of regulatory targets increases (prevent inefficient bypass of the essential facility, offset users' market power, etc.), further regulatory instruments are needed if one does not want the interconnection charges to be jack-of-all-trades and masters of none.
Translated title of the contribution | Liberalization and interconnection charges |
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Original language | French |
Pages (from-to) | 306-314 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | Annales Des Télécommunications |
Volume | 50 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 1995 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Competition
- Costs
- Economic analysis
- Local network
- Monopoly
- Optimization
- Regulation
- Telecommunication operator
- Trunk network
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering