Limited and online supply and the Bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design

Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D Hartline

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study auctions for selling a limited supply of a single commodity in the case where the supply is known in advance and the case it is unknown and must be instead allocated in an online fashion. The latter variant was proposed by Mahdian and Saberi [12] as a model of an important phenomena in auctions for selling Internet advertising: advertising impressions must be allocated as they arrive and the total quantity available is unknown in advance. We describe the Bayesian optimal mechanism for these variants and extend the random sampling auction of Goldberg et al. [8] to address the prior-free case.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEC'09 - Proceedings of the 2009 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Pages41-49
Number of pages9
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2009
Event2009 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'09 - Stanford, CA, United States
Duration: Jul 6 2009Jul 10 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Other

Other2009 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'09
CountryUnited States
CityStanford, CA
Period7/6/097/10/09

Keywords

  • Auction
  • Limited supply
  • Mechanism design
  • Online
  • Prior-free

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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