Lipschitz games

Yaron Azrieli, Eran Shmaya

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

The Lipschitz constant of a finite normal-form game is the maximal change in some player's payoff when a single opponent changes his strategy. We prove that games with small Lipschitz constant admit pure .-equilibria, and pinpoint the maximal Lipschitz constant that is sufficient to imply existence of a pure .-equilibrium as a function of the number of players in the game and the number of strategies of each player. Our proofs use the probabilistic method.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)350-357
Number of pages8
JournalMathematics of Operations Research
Volume38
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2013

Keywords

  • Large games
  • Lipschitz games
  • Pure equilibrium
  • Purification

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics(all)
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Management Science and Operations Research

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