Love (of god) as a middle way between dogmatism and hyper-rationalism in ethics

Kyla Ebels-Duggan*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In the Groundwork Kant asserts that the fundamental moral principle must be a principle of autonomy. He dismisses theistic principles, along with all other competitors to his Categorical Imperative, claiming that they are heteronomous. I argue that the best case for this Kantian conclusion conflates our access to the reasons for our commitments with an ability to state these reasons such that they could figure in an argument. This conflation, in turn, results from a certain Kantian conception of inclination, and its role in our moral psychology. These are views that we ought to reject. Having done so, we will see that a theistic ethics based on desire or love for God need not face a distinctive problem of heteronomy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)279-298
Number of pages20
JournalFaith and Philosophy
Volume35
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Religious studies
  • Philosophy

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