MAC games for distributed wireless network security with incomplete information of selfish and malicious user types

Yalin Evren Sagduyu, Randall Berry, Anthony Ephremides

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

51 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider game theoretic models of wireless medium access control (MAC) in which each transmitter makes individual decisions regarding their power level or transmission probability. This allows for scalable distributed operation; however, it can also enable users to pursue malicious objectives such as jamming other nodes to deny them service. We study games with two types of players: selfish and malicious transmitters. Each type is characterized by a utility function depending on throughput reward and energy cost. Furthermore, we focus on the setting where the transmitters have incomplete information regarding other transmitters' types, modeled as probabilistic beliefs. We first analyze a power-controlled MAC game in which the nodes select powers for continuous transmissions and then extend this to a random access MAC in which nodes choose transmission probabilities. For each case, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies are derived for different degrees of uncertainty, and the resulting equilibrium throughput of selfish nodes is characterized. We identify conditions in which the throughput improves with increasing type uncertainty and introduce Bayesian learning mechanisms to update the type beliefs in repeated games. For unknown types and costs, we also specify the equilibrium cut-off thresholds for monotonic transmission decisions. The analysis provides insights into the optimal defense mechanisms against denial of service attacks at the MAC layer in wireless networks.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
Pages130-139
Number of pages10
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 20 2009
Event2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: May 13 2009May 15 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09

Other

Other2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
CountryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period5/13/095/15/09

Keywords

  • Bayesian games
  • Distributed operation
  • Incomplete information
  • MAC
  • Malicious users
  • Power control
  • Random access
  • Security
  • Selfish users

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

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