TY - JOUR
T1 - Managerial rewards and the behavior of for-profit, governmental, and nonprofit organizations
T2 - Evidence from the hospital industry
AU - Ballou, Jeffrey P.
AU - Weisbrod, Burton A.
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Kate Antonovics, Christoph Badelt, Kathleen Carroll, Richard Carson, David Cutler, Burcay Erus, Edward Glaeser, Alphonse Holtman, Richard Kronick, Paul Oyer, James Poterba, Maxim Sinitsyn, Al Slivinski, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Ballou gratefully acknowledges support from the Aspen Institute. Weisbrod thanks the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and the Northwestern University Institute for Policy Research for support of his research on the nonprofit sector. He also thanks Thomas Flannery and The Hay Group for making available data from their survey of managerial compensation.
PY - 2003/9/1
Y1 - 2003/9/1
N2 - Studies of mixed industries frequently focus on differential behavior between for-profit and either nonprofit or governmental producers. Substantially less is known about differences among governmental, religious nonprofit, and secular nonprofit organizations. We examine the compensation of hospital CEOs to assess the extent to which these three organizational forms pursue similar objectives. Compensation levels, the use of salaries versus bonuses as proxies for weak versus strong incentives, and the criteria organizations use to determine bonuses are analyzed. We conclude that the CEO incentive contracts at religious nonprofit, secular nonprofit, and governmental hospitals imply substantive differences in the behavior of these organizations.
AB - Studies of mixed industries frequently focus on differential behavior between for-profit and either nonprofit or governmental producers. Substantially less is known about differences among governmental, religious nonprofit, and secular nonprofit organizations. We examine the compensation of hospital CEOs to assess the extent to which these three organizational forms pursue similar objectives. Compensation levels, the use of salaries versus bonuses as proxies for weak versus strong incentives, and the criteria organizations use to determine bonuses are analyzed. We conclude that the CEO incentive contracts at religious nonprofit, secular nonprofit, and governmental hospitals imply substantive differences in the behavior of these organizations.
KW - Comparative institutional form
KW - Incentives
KW - Nonprofit
KW - Organization behavior
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U2 - 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00224-9
DO - 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00224-9
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0141761218
VL - 87
SP - 1895
EP - 1920
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
SN - 0047-2727
IS - 9-10
ER -