Managing procurement auctions

Sudipto Dasgupta*, Daniel F. Spulber

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

86 Scopus citations

Abstract

Three mechanisms are considered that extend the standard fixed quantity auction: (I) sole sourcing with output chosen in advance by a buyer with downward-sloping demand; (II) sole sourcing with an output schedule based on revelation of cost parameters; and (III) multiple sourcing with output allocation across suppliers based on revelation of cost parameters. Procedures are characterized for the sole sourcing and multiple sourcing problems that implement the buyer's optimal mechanism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)5-29
Number of pages25
JournalInformation Economics and Policy
Volume4
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1989

Keywords

  • Auctions
  • bidding
  • defense
  • dual-sourcing
  • government procurement
  • sealed bids

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

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