Manipulation through Bribes

James Schummer*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

36 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider allocation rules that choose outcomes and transfers, based on agents' reported valuations of the outcomes. A bribing situation exists when one agent could pay another to misreport his valuations, resulting in a net gain to both. A bribe-proof rule eliminates such opportunities. We show that under a bribe-proof rule, each agent's payoff is a continuous function of other agents' reported valuations. Furthermore, on connected domains, if the set of outcomes is finite or the domain is smoothly connected, each agent's payoff is a constant function of other agents' reports. Finally, under a domain-richness condition, a bribe-proof rule must be constant. The results apply to a broad class of economies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, D70.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)180-198
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume91
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2000

Keywords

  • Strategy-proof; bribe; manipulation; collusion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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