Abstract
Security is a critical concern in shared spectrum environments, where attacks can degrade service and influence market interactions between competing service providers (SPs). This paper examines market models in shared spectrum defense, focusing on the strategic interplay between SPs and attackers within licensed shared bands. We develop models to study SPs' investments in security against revenue-minimizing attackers, i.e., attackers that account for the underlying competition between SPs and seek to minimize the revenue they obtain in this market. We further consider both competitive and collaborative setting. In the competitive setting, we characterize equilibrium investment outcomes, while in the collaborative case, we consider the investments made by a central planner. Our numerical results show that at times the competitive setting can lead to over-investment.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | 2024 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, DySPAN 2024 |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
Pages | 227-230 |
Number of pages | 4 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9798350317640 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2024 |
Event | 2024 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, DySPAN 2024 - Washington, United States Duration: May 13 2024 → May 16 2024 |
Publication series
Name | 2024 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, DySPAN 2024 |
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Conference
Conference | 2024 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, DySPAN 2024 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Washington |
Period | 5/13/24 → 5/16/24 |
Funding
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation (NSF) SII-Center: SpectrumX An NSF Spectrum Innovation Center Grant (Federal Grant Number 2132700) and by NSF grants CNS-1908807 and CNS-2148183.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Signal Processing
- Aerospace Engineering