@article{9e921c33108d4f79bb7214bdb294959f,
title = "Market selection and asymmetric information",
abstract = "We consider a dynamic general equilibrium asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and asymmetric information. We show how agents' different methods of gathering information affect their chances of survival in the market depending upon the nature of the information and the level of noise in the economy.",
author = "Mailath, {George J.} and Alvaro Sandroni",
note = "Funding Information: Acknowledgements. We thank many audiences for their helpful comments. We also thank Mark Armstrong and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Mailath thankfully acknowledges financial support under NSF Grants SBR-9810693 and SES-0095768. Sandroni thankfully acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation Grants SBR-9730385 and SES-0l09650. The work described here has been presented previously under the title {"}Poor Information can be Valuable{"}.",
year = "2003",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1111/1467-937X.00247",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "70",
pages = "343--368",
journal = "Review of Economic Studies",
issn = "0034-6527",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "2",
}