Abstract
This article develops two models of the market-organization relationship - an administered-efficiency model and a bureaucratic-politics model. Quantitative analyses of individual and job-level data in a state government pay system indicate that the administered-efficiency model does not adequately explain male-female earnings differences. Documentary, testimonial, and interview data strongly suggest the significance of bureaucratic politics in the pay-determination process. We conclude that market forces influence wage rates but are heavily mediated by organizational factors unrelated to efficiency considerations. -from Authors
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 616-658 |
Number of pages | 43 |
Journal | American Journal of Sociology |
Volume | 95 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 1989 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science