Abstract
We estimate the productivity effects of labor specialization using a judicial environment that offers a quasi-experimental setting well suited to this purpose. Judges in this environment are randomly assigned many different types of cases. This assignment generates random streaks of same-type cases, which creates minispecialization events unrelated to the characteristics of judges or cases. We estimate that when judges receive more cases of a certain type, they become faster, that is, more likely to close cases of that type in any one of the corresponding hearings. Quality, as measured by probability of an appeal, is not negatively affected.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 403-426 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | Journal of Law and Economics |
Volume | 62 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 1 2019 |
Funding
This research was conducted in collaboration with the training unit of the Court of Rome. We are grateful to Roman Acosta for outstanding research assistance and Amelia Torrice and Margher-ita Leone for feedback on early versions of the manuscript. This research was undertaken, in part, thanks to funding from the Canada Research Chairs program. The usual caveats apply.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Law