Mechanism design (new developments)

Bantwal Sandeep Baliga, Tomas Sjöström

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingEntry for encyclopedia/dictionary


Mechanism design concerns the question: given some desirable outcome, can we design a game which produces it? This theory provides a foundation for many important fields, such as auction theory and contract theory. We survey the recent literature dealing with topics such as robustness of mechanisms, renegotiation and collusion. An important issue is whether simple and intuitively appealing mechanisms can be optimal. Finally, we discuss what can be learned from recent experiments.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
EditorsSteven N. Durlauf, Lawrence E. Blume
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan
StatePublished - 2008


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