Mechanism design (new developments)

Bantwal Sandeep Baliga; Tomas Sjöström

doi:10.1057/9780230226203.1079

Mechanism design (new developments)

Bantwal Sandeep Baliga, Tomas Sjöström

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Entry for encyclopedia/dictionary

Abstract

Mechanism design concerns the question: given some desirable outcome, can we design a game which produces it? This theory provides a foundation for many important fields, such as auction theory and contract theory. We survey the recent literature dealing with topics such as robustness of mechanisms, renegotiation and collusion. An important issue is whether simple and intuitively appealing mechanisms can be optimal. Finally, we discuss what can be learned from recent experiments.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
Editors	Steven N. Durlauf, Lawrence E. Blume
Publisher	Palgrave Macmillan
Edition	2nd
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230226203.1079
State	Published - 2008

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http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_M000395

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abstract = "Mechanism design concerns the question: given some desirable outcome, can we design a game which produces it? This theory provides a foundation for many important fields, such as auction theory and contract theory. We survey the recent literature dealing with topics such as robustness of mechanisms, renegotiation and collusion. An important issue is whether simple and intuitively appealing mechanisms can be optimal. Finally, we discuss what can be learned from recent experiments.",

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ER -

Mechanism design (new developments)

Abstract

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