Abstract
I argue that Meno's Paradox targets the type of knowledge that Socrates has been looking for earlier in the dialogue: knowledge grounded in explanatory definitions. Socrates places strict requirements on definitions and thinks we need these definitions to acquire knowledge. Meno's challenge uses Socrates' constraints to argue that we can neither propose definitions nor recognize them. To understand Socrates' response to the challenge, we need to view Meno's challenge and Socrates' response as part of a larger disagreement about the value of inquiry.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 4-24 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | British Journal for the History of Philosophy |
Volume | 22 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 2 2014 |
Keywords
- Meno's Paradox
- definition
- inquiry
- knowledge
- recollection
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy