Abstract
A merger is said to have coordinated effects if it results in more collusive outcomes. I review the theory of collusion, and the role played by communication in coordination. Mergers can affect the enforcement and participation constraints for a collusive agreement, and the selection from the equilibrium set of outcomes. I describe some recent empirical studies of the effects of mergers on collusion, and the underlying measurement issues associated with identifying the degree of coordination. I also discuss some recent cases in which coordinated effects were a concern, including both merger reviews and ex post investigations.
Original language | English (US) |
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Article number | 102583 |
Journal | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
Volume | 73 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2020 |
Keywords
- Antitrust
- Collusion
- Coordinated effects
- Mergers
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Industrial relations
- Aerospace Engineering
- Economics and Econometrics
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
- Strategy and Management
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering