Mergers and coordinated effects

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Abstract

A merger is said to have coordinated effects if it results in more collusive outcomes. I review the theory of collusion, and the role played by communication in coordination. Mergers can affect the enforcement and participation constraints for a collusive agreement, and the selection from the equilibrium set of outcomes. I describe some recent empirical studies of the effects of mergers on collusion, and the underlying measurement issues associated with identifying the degree of coordination. I also discuss some recent cases in which coordinated effects were a concern, including both merger reviews and ex post investigations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number102583
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2020

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Keywords

  • Antitrust
  • Collusion
  • Coordinated effects
  • Mergers

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Industrial relations
  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering

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