Mind Attribution is for Morality

Liane Young, Adam Gray Waytz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Mental state reasoning is crucial for moral evaluation and social interaction. In the first half of the paper, we discuss recent and ongoing work on mental state reasoning for moral evaluation – judging agents from a position “on high” as an observer or a judge. In the second half of the paper, we turn to moral cognition “on the ground” – mental state reasoning for social interaction. We discuss evidence indicating distinct behavioral and neural signatures of mental state reasoning for distinct motivational contexts – for interacting with ingroups versus outgroups, for cooperation versus competition, and for affiliation versus action prediction.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationUnderstanding Other Minds
Subtitle of host publicationPerspectives from Developmental Social Neuroscience
EditorsSimon Baron-Cohen, Michael Lombardo, Helen Tager-Flusberg
Place of PublicationOxford, UK
PublisherOxford University Press, Inc.
Pages93-103
Number of pages11
ISBN (Print)9780199692972
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013

Fingerprint

Attribution
Mental State
Morality
Social Interaction
Moral Evaluation
Observer
Signature
Moral Cognition
Prediction

Cite this

Young, L., & Waytz, A. G. (2013). Mind Attribution is for Morality. In S. Baron-Cohen, M. Lombardo, & H. Tager-Flusberg (Eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Social Neuroscience (pp. 93-103). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692972.001.0001
Young, Liane ; Waytz, Adam Gray. / Mind Attribution is for Morality. Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Social Neuroscience. editor / Simon Baron-Cohen ; Michael Lombardo ; Helen Tager-Flusberg. Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press, Inc., 2013. pp. 93-103
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Young, L & Waytz, AG 2013, Mind Attribution is for Morality. in S Baron-Cohen, M Lombardo & H Tager-Flusberg (eds), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, Inc., Oxford, UK, pp. 93-103. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692972.001.0001

Mind Attribution is for Morality. / Young, Liane; Waytz, Adam Gray.

Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Social Neuroscience. ed. / Simon Baron-Cohen; Michael Lombardo; Helen Tager-Flusberg. Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press, Inc., 2013. p. 93-103.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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Young L, Waytz AG. Mind Attribution is for Morality. In Baron-Cohen S, Lombardo M, Tager-Flusberg H, editors, Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Social Neuroscience. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, Inc. 2013. p. 93-103 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692972.001.0001