Minimalism and paradoxes

Michael Glanzberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations


This paper argues against minimalism about truth. It does so by way of a comparison of the theory of truth with the theory of sets, and consideration of where paradoxes may arise in each. The paper proceeds by asking two seemingly unrelated questions. First, what is the theory of truth about? Answering this question shows that minimalism bears important similarities to naive set theory. Second, why is there no strengthened version of Russell's paradox, as there is a strengthened Liar paradox? Answering this question shows that like naive set theory, minimalism is unable to make adequate progress in resolving the paradoxes, and must be replaced by a drastically different sort of theory. Such a theory, it is shown, must be fundamentally non-minimalist.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)13-36
Number of pages24
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2003

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Social Sciences(all)


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