Minimalism and phenomenological evidence

Patricia Marechal*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review


It has been recently argued that the phenomenology of semantic perception casts doubts on Grice's theory of meaning. I defend the psychological and theoretical plausibility of a form of Gricean minimalism, by setting new boundaries to the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This strategy consists in abandoning the entailment from what is said to what is meant, and advancing a conception of the semantic notion of what is said that departs from speaker-hearers' intuitions. This proposal has important consequences both concerning the evidence that should be used by philosophers of language when evaluating semantic theories, and the way we should carve up linguistic processing.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)141-153
Number of pages13
Issue number1
StatePublished - Apr 2017


  • Linguistic processing
  • Minimalism
  • Pragmatics
  • Semantic perception
  • Semantics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science


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