Abstract
It has been recently argued that the phenomenology of semantic perception casts doubts on Grice's theory of meaning. I defend the psychological and theoretical plausibility of a form of Gricean minimalism, by setting new boundaries to the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This strategy consists in abandoning the entailment from what is said to what is meant, and advancing a conception of the semantic notion of what is said that departs from speaker-hearers' intuitions. This proposal has important consequences both concerning the evidence that should be used by philosophers of language when evaluating semantic theories, and the way we should carve up linguistic processing.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 141-153 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Principia |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 2017 |
Keywords
- Linguistic processing
- Minimalism
- Pragmatics
- Semantic perception
- Semantics
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
- History and Philosophy of Science