Models of coalition behavior: Game theoretic, social psychological, and political perspectives

J. Keith Murnighan*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

114 Scopus citations

Abstract

Reviews 3 classes of game theoretic solution concepts (solutions, subsolutions, and the core; bargaining set models; and the Shapley value), 4 social psychological models of coalition formation (minimum resource theory, minimum power theory, bargaining theory, and the weighted probability model), and 3 sets of political coalition models (minimum size, minimum range, and policy distance minimization). The research on characteristic function games, experimental coalition situations involving more than 3 players, and on coalition governments is summarized, and the models are evaluated. The advantages of collaboration among the 3 areas are discussed. (89 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1130-1153
Number of pages24
JournalPsychological bulletin
Volume85
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 1978

Keywords

  • coalition behavior models, game theoretic vs social psychological vs political perspectives

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychology(all)

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