Modes of communication

Mathias Dewatripont*, Jean Tirole

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    101 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    The paper develops a theory of costly communication in which the sender's and receiver's motivations and abilities endogenously determine the communication mode and the transfer of knowledge. Communication is modeled as a problem of moral hazard in teams, in which the sender and receiver select persuasion and message elaboration efforts. The model is shown to provide a rich set of insights concerning (i) the impact of incentive alignment on communication strategies, (ii) the relative influence and the complementarity/substitutability between issue-relevant communication and cues (information that relates to the credibility of the sender rather than to the issue at stake), and (iii) the path dependency of communication.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1217-1238
    Number of pages22
    JournalJournal of Political Economy
    Volume113
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 2005

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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