Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection

David Besanko

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(85)90122-3

Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection

David Besanko^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

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Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

38 Scopus citations

Abstract

Multi-period contracts with adverse selection at the time of contracting are studied. With risk-neutrality and independent private information, all inefficiency arises in the first period only. With positive serial correlation, inefficiency is more pervasive but declines over time.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	33-37
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	17
Issue number	1-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90122-3
State	Published - 1985

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0165-1765(85)90122-3

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@article{aa91d98929104a6590928cb95f026624,

title = "Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection",

abstract = "Multi-period contracts with adverse selection at the time of contracting are studied. With risk-neutrality and independent private information, all inefficiency arises in the first period only. With positive serial correlation, inefficiency is more pervasive but declines over time.",

author = "David Besanko",

note = "Funding Information: * I would like to thank David Brown and David Sappington for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. This work has been supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, no. SES-8408355.",

year = "1985",

doi = "10.1016/0165-1765(85)90122-3",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "17",

pages = "33--37",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

number = "1-2",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection

AU - Besanko, David

N1 - Funding Information: * I would like to thank David Brown and David Sappington for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. This work has been supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, no. SES-8408355.

PY - 1985

Y1 - 1985

N2 - Multi-period contracts with adverse selection at the time of contracting are studied. With risk-neutrality and independent private information, all inefficiency arises in the first period only. With positive serial correlation, inefficiency is more pervasive but declines over time.

AB - Multi-period contracts with adverse selection at the time of contracting are studied. With risk-neutrality and independent private information, all inefficiency arises in the first period only. With positive serial correlation, inefficiency is more pervasive but declines over time.

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U2 - 10.1016/0165-1765(85)90122-3

DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(85)90122-3

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0040198215

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 17

SP - 33

EP - 37

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 1-2

ER -

Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection

Abstract

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