Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection

David Besanko*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

26 Scopus citations

Abstract

Multi-period contracts with adverse selection at the time of contracting are studied. With risk-neutrality and independent private information, all inefficiency arises in the first period only. With positive serial correlation, inefficiency is more pervasive but declines over time.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)33-37
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume17
Issue number1-2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1985

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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